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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The hedge fund industry has grown considerably in recent years, largely due 
to enormous profits derived from risky investment activities.  As highly complex 
investment vehicles with unique strategies, hedge funds have become the center of 
much debate between investors, who hope to receive high returns, and regulators, 
who hope to bring the industry under their authority.  While hedge funds offer many 
benefits, the wide variety of financial products and strategies are oftentimes 
inherently risky.  Many hedge fund managers make high stakes bets on uncertain 
investments, which may yield serious consequences for world markets if a wager 
goes sour.  Although the financial sector has survived two major hedge fund 
collapses—Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) and Amaranth Advisors 
(“Amaranth”)—the potential for disaster remains.  Without regulatory oversight, the 
hedge fund industry is free to roll the dice in large market segments and make Las 
Vegas style bets using billions of investor dollars.  
This Article explores the nature of the hedge fund industry and the 
consequences of the high risk/high return strategy utilized by many funds.  In 
addition, this Article illustrates the large amount of risk involved in hedge fund 
investments and the need for regulatory scrutiny.  Section II begins with an overview 
of the hedge fund industry, describing the key players and the growth of 
investments.  Section III details the types of strategies used by many hedge funds 
and the high returns offered under dangerous conditions.  Section IV highlights the 
results of high-risk investing and the various market consequences.  Section V 
provides an overview of the current regulatory framework governing the hedge fund 
industry and explains a recent United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) attempt to bring hedge funds within its regulatory authority.  Section VI 
illustrates the potential for disaster and describes the downfall of LTCM and 
Amaranth.  Finally, Section VII provides possible solutions to current regulatory 
loopholes and proposes that congressional legislation may change the future of the 
hedge fund industry. 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PLAYING FIELD 
A. The Hedge Fund Game 
The term “hedge fund” was coined in 1949 when it was used to describe a 
private partnership managed by Alfred Winslow Jones.1  Fearing poor returns during 
market slumps, Jones created a “hedging” strategy that would neutralize the effect of 
market factors on his portfolio’s performance.2  He invested in both long and short 
positions in common stocks, while using a modest amount of leverage3 to hedge his 
bets, so that changes in equity markets would affect only half of his investment 
portfolio.4  In this way, Jones sought to balance market risk and produce a net return 
that depended on his ability to select “the relative best and worst” investments.5
Today, hedge funds trade in a wide variety of financial instruments and 
employ a number of strategies6 that may not reflect the traditional hedging and 
arbitrage strategies Jones developed.7  The term “hedge fund” has become illusive 
because “many ‘hedge funds’ are not actually hedged.”8  Thus, there is no universal 
definition to describe the various types of hedge funds;9 they include “any pooled 
                                                     
1 ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT 25 (2000) [hereinafter LOWENSTEIN]. 
2 Id. 
3 STUART A. MCCRARY, HOW TO CREATE & MANAGE A HEDGE FUND: A PROFESSIONAL’S GUIDE 1 
(2002) [hereinafter MCCRARY]. 
4 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 25 (“The term ‘hedge fund’ is a colloquialism derived from the 
expression ‘to hedge one’s bets,’ meaning to limit the possibility of loss on a speculation by betting on 
the other side.”). 
5 Id. 
6 STAFF OF THE SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 3 (Sept. 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgfunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF 
REPORT]. 
7 See Testimony Concerning Investor Protection Implications of Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Former Chairman, 
Securities and Exchange Commission), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/041003tswhd.htm 
[hereinafter Investor Protection Testimony].   
8 Id.; see Section III, infra. 
9 Id. 
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investment vehicle that is privately organized, administered by professional 
investment managers, and not widely available to the public.”10  Essentially, the term 
is a catchall classification for a number of privately-managed pools of capital that are 
not registered under the Investment Company Act.11   
B. The Dealers 
Hedge funds usually are created “by former traders, analysts or portfolio 
managers”12 and are organized as limited partnerships or limited liability 
companies.13  The limited partnership form is the most common, wherein a general 
partner has exclusive responsibility and authority for the management of the fund; 
the limited partners divest control in exchange for limited liability.14  The general 
partner, who is either a natural person or a separate legal entity, is typically 
considered the fund manager or “investment adviser,” and is responsible for 
portfolio management and fund operations.15  Based largely on the agreement of the 
limited partnership, the duties of hedge fund managers vary and may include 
marketing the fund, soliciting investors, and developing investment strategies.16  
Managers typically receive lucrative fees for their services, including a standard 
management fee of one to two percent per year of the assets under management.17  
In addition, hedge fund managers have a stake in the game, and generally receive an 
                                                     
10 THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE 
LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1 (1999) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S WORKING 
GROUP].  
11 Investor Protection Testimony, supra note 7; SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at viii. 
12 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 52. 
13 See DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 88 (2005) [hereinafter 
DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL.].  
14 Id. at 88-91. 
15 Id. at 91-92.  Because general partners face several tax and liability issues, they are commonly 
organized as limited liability companies or corporations.  Id. at 92.  For the purposes of this Article, 
“hedge fund manager” will refer to the general partner of a hedge fund who is vested with the 
responsibility for the operation and control of the fund, as well as the fund’s investment strategy. 
16 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 52-53; see DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 90. 
17 MCCRARY, supra note 3, at 13. 
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incentive fee if the fund performs well.18  Incentive fees are typically twenty percent 
of the fund’s net return.19
C. The Players & the Buy-in 
Hedge fund investors are the limited partners of the limited partnership and 
are not liable for the fund’s debts beyond the amount of their investment (and any 
undistributed profits).20  Investors purchase an “interest” in the hedge fund and 
essentially contribute their money to a “pool of assets,” which is then invested under 
the direction of the fund manager.21  In this sense, investors have little involvement 
with their investment once they have purchased an interest in the fund.  Rather, 
investors place large amounts of money in the hands of an “investment adviser,” 
who they hope will invest wisely.  Through this type of investment, hedge fund 
investors generally hope to achieve portfolio diversification, reduce overall portfolio 
risk, and garner a larger return than with traditional assets.22  Investors, therefore, 
make high stakes bets with hedge funds, in which they hope to win big but often 
stand to lose even more.  
The nature of investors and the manner in which they are solicited is largely 
determined by efforts to avoid regulation under the federal securities laws.23  In 
general, however, hedge funds traditionally attract wealthy individuals and families 
who have the financial backing and stability to support alternative investment 
strategies.24  Increasingly, however, funds are attracting institutional investors who 
are able to meet “private offering standards.”25  Hedge funds now attract 
                                                     
18 Id. at 14. 
19 Id.  
20 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 88. 
21 Id. at 1-3. 
22 MCCRARY, supra note 3, at 3. 
23 See Section IV, infra. 
24 See LARS JAEGER, MANAGING RISK IN ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES: SUCCESSFUL 
INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS AND MANAGED FUTURES 3-4 (2002) [hereinafter JAEGER]. 
25 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 1. 
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endowments, private foundations, pension plans, and funds of hedge funds.26  As of 
January 2005, individuals and families still accounted for the largest share of hedge 
fund capital, owning 44 percent of the total amount invested.27  In the aggregate, 
institutional investors own approximately 56 percent of the total amount invested in 
hedge funds: funds of hedge funds own up to 28 percent; corporations own up to 14 
percent; pension funds own up to seven percent; and foundations and endowments 
own up to seven percent.28   
D. The Pot is Increasing 
Due to increasing attention from several large market segments, the hedge 
fund industry has experienced tremendous growth in both size and scope.29  The 
number of funds has increased significantly from 530 in 199030 to approximately 
8,800 as of July 2006.31  The SEC estimates that 2,000 new hedge funds were created 
in 2005 alone.32  Total assets under management topped 1.2 trillion dollars in 2006, a 
three thousand percent increase from thirty billion dollars in 1990.33  Most notably, 
endowments have continued to increase their exposure to hedge funds.34  In 2005, 
the average endowment allocated 8.7 percent of its portfolio assets to hedge funds, a 
                                                     
26 Id. at 95.  A fund of hedge funds “is a hedge fund that utilizes a multi-manager, multi-strategy 
approach by investing all, or a significant portion, of its assets in hedge funds.”  SEC STAFF REPORT, 
supra note 6, at 67. 
27 Deborah Solomon, Congress May Let Hedge Funds Manage More Pension Money, WALL ST. J., July 28, 
2006, at A1 (citing Hennessee Group LLC).   
28 Id.   
29 It is important to note that many hedge funds do not disclose information, so the statistics 
presented in this paper reflect the views and opinions of analysts and are, at best, an estimate of hedge 
fund volume. 
30 CTR. FOR INT’L SEC. & DERIVATIVES MKTS. RESEARCH DEP’T, THE BENEFITS OF HEDGE FUNDS: 
2006 UPDATE 5 (May 2006) [hereinafter CISDM]. 
31  Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs (2006) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts072506cc.htm [hereinafter Regulation Testimony]. 
32 Id. 
33 Id., CISDM, supra note 30, at 4. 
34 CISDM, supra note 30, at 4-5. 
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1.4 percent increase from 2004.35  Overall, hedge funds currently account for 
approximately thirty percent of all U.S. equity trading volume, which poses 
considerable implications for financial markets.36
III. RISKY GAMES: THE UNIQUE STRATEGIES OF HEDGE FUNDS 
As mentioned previously, hedge funds employ a number of investment 
strategies.  While some hedge funds still utilize the traditional “hedging” strategy 
developed by Alfred Winslow Jones, the industry now encompasses a wide variety of 
investment styles.37  Hedge fund managers usually devise strategies based on their 
investment expertise; thus, the activities of hedge funds are extremely diverse.38  For 
instance, “some hedge funds invest only in securities and only for the long term.”39  
Other funds never actually invest in the traditional sense, and rather, continuously 
“trade to profit from market and security depreciation.”40  Some hedge funds stick to 
fundamental strategies, “others rely on technical analysis,” and at least one hedge 
fund claims to base its trading decisions on astrological charts.41
Thus, hedge funds are unique investment vehicles utilizing various 
investment products,42 strategies,43 performance levels, and degrees of risk.44  Many 
hedge funds employ a combination of investment products and strategies that 
35 Id. 
36 Regulation Testimony, supra note 31; see Section IV, infra. 
37 See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 34. 
38 See id. at 34, 52. 
39 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 1. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Hedge Funds trade in a number of investment products, including “fixed income securities, 
convertible securities, currencies, exchange-traded futures, over-the-counter derivatives, futures 
contracts, commodity options and other non-securities investments.”  SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 
6, at 3. 
43 Common hedge fund strategies include market trend, event-driven, and arbitrage.  Id. at 34-36. 
44 See id. at 34. 
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change frequently based on market conditions.45  This flexibility allows funds to 
pursue an absolute return approach that is “profitable in both rising and declining 
markets.”46  As a result, hedge funds generally outperform standard benchmarks, but 
involve greater risk in doing so.47
A. Big Wins from High Returns 
The high returns associated with hedge funds are derived from the fund 
manager’s skill and the underlying investment strategy.48  Hedge funds are actively 
traded; hence, a manager’s ability to identify changes in market factors and current 
trends is extremely important to a fund’s performance.49  These unique strategies and 
skills have enabled hedge funds to achieve greater returns when compared to 
traditional assets, drawing increased interest from the financial community.50   
In a performance comparison study conducted by the Center for 
International Securities and Derivatives Markets (“CISDM”),51 analysts found that, 
over the past 16 years, hedge funds have provided significant standalone 
performance and portfolio diversification as compared to traditional investment 
vehicles.52  From 1990 to 2005, the CISDM Equal Weighted Hedge Fund Index53 
                                                     
45 See id. at 33. 
46 Id. at 36.  In contrast, most registered investment companies pursue a relative return strategy that 
“seek[s] positive returns compared to the performance of a particular asset class or index.”  Id.  These 
strategies focus on outperforming a “benchmark,” regardless of profitability.  Id. 
47 PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 3. 
48 CISDM, supra note 30, at 7. 
49 Id. 
50 See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 3. 
51 CISDM “is a non-profit academic research center which focuses on security and investment fund 
performance in both U.S. and international asset markets” located at the Isenberg School of 
Management of the University of Massachusetts Amherst.  CISDM, About Us, 
http://cisdm.som.umass.edu/aboutus/aboutus.shtml.   CISDM funds research in traditional and 
alternative financial markets and provides educational material to financial firms, non-financial firms, 
and the general public.  Id.  CISDM has produced a series of papers, updated annually, that analyze 
the risk and return benefits of hedge funds and other alternative investment products when 
considered as a part of an investor’s overall portfolio.  CISDM, “Benefits of” Series, 
http://cisdm.som.umass.edu/research/benefits.shtml.
52 CISDM, supra note 30, at 14.  
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yielded a 15.13 percent annualized return, compared to the 10.55 percent return of 
the Standard & Poor’s 500 (“S&P 500”)54 and the 4.15 percent return on a three-
month Treasury bill.55  CISDM’s study also illustrates the growth of a one hundred 
dollar investment made in 1990 in various asset types, including the CISDM Equal 
Weighted Hedge Fund Index, the S&P 500, the Lehman U.S. Aggregate, and the 
MSCI World.56  The Equal Weighted Hedge Fund Index had superior performance 
over the 16-year period; the initial one hundred dollar investment would have been 
worth nine hundred dollars by July 2005, as compared to five hundred dollars if 
invested in the S&P 500, the asset class with the second-highest returns.57  While the 
returns of individual hedge funds vary, CISDM found that the hedge fund industry 
as a whole consistently outperforms traditional equity and bond investments.58
B. But, a Big Gamble 
The hefty returns and diversification benefits of hedge funds do not come 
without a price.  In order to achieve absolute returns, hedge fund managers employ a 
number of inherently risky techniques and strategies.  Thus, while hedge funds 
theoretically offer less portfolio risk for investors, many fund managers often make 
risky bets on financial products and take chances in volatile industries that they 
believe are headed for success.  In financial terminology, risk is “related to the 
volatility of the future value of a position due to market changes.”59  Hedge fund 
                                                                                                                                                 
53 The CISDM Equal Weighted Hedge Fund Index reflects “the overall composition of the hedge 
fund universe.”  Id. at 3.  It depicts “the average performance of hedge fund managers reporting to 
the CISDM Hedge Fund/CTA Database.  Its objective is to provide an estimate of the rate of return 
to an equally weighted portfolio of hedge fund managers who trade a wide variety of hedge fund 
strategies which are based on a wide variety of trading models.”  CISDM, Equal Weighted Hedge 
Fund Index, http://cisdm.som.umass.edu/indices/hedge/hedgefundweighted.asp. 
54 CISDM, supra note 30, at 15.  The S&P 500 Index reflects the equity performance of five hundred 
leading U.S. companies in several industries, and is regarded as the best gauge of the U.S. equities 
market.  See S&P Indices, 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=sp/Page/IndicesIndexGroupPg&r
=1&l=EN&b=4&s=6&ig=51&f=1. 
55 CISDM, supra note 30, at 15. 
56 Id. at 9-10. 
57 Id. at 10. 
58 Id. at 9. 
59 DIMISTRIS N. CHORAFAS, ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS AND THE MISMANAGEMENT OF RISK 5 
(2003). 
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managers attempt to predict future market changes, but as one analyst remarked: 
“Foretelling these changes is an art, not a science, and forecasters often fail in their 
assumptions.”60  Although many fund managers are experts in their field, they are 
not clairvoyant.61  Thus, while uncertain odds and strategies may pay off, managers 
often take dangerous chances at the peril of the fund, as in the case of LTCM and 
Amaranth.  
 One risky component of many hedge fund strategies is the use of leverage to 
increase the fund’s value and return.62  Leverage was traditionally obtained through 
the use of borrowed money, but many hedge funds now purchase securities using 
“futures, options and other derivative contracts.”63  Unlike investment companies, 
hedge funds are not restricted in their ability to use leverage, and thus employ this 
tool much more aggressively than other investment vehicles.64  While leverage can 
significantly enhance investment returns, it can also magnify investment losses.65  
Highly-leveraged entities face enormous potential losses that can destroy the fund’s 
net worth.66  The chance that a highly-leveraged entity will fail increases in a volatile 
market.67
Most hedge funds actively trade securities to take advantage of short-term 
price changes and to maintain a desired risk-return profile when market prices 
fluctuate.68  Thus, unlike traditional investments, hedge funds change positions 
frequently to seek higher returns or other arbitrage opportunities.69  In addition, 
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 37. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 37-38.  The Investment Company Act of 1940 limits investment companies’ use of leverage.  
Id. at 38. 
65 Id. at 37. 
66 PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 23. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 5.  
69 Id. at 5, A-2. 
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hedge funds engage heavily in short-selling, in which the fund buys “higher 
expected-return securities and sell[s] short lower-expected-return securities,” or buys 
securities in a target company and simultaneously sells short the securities of the 
acquiring company.70  The intended result of short-selling is to gain a profit “from an 
expected downward price movement, to provide liquidity in response to 
unanticipated demand or to hedge the risk of a long position in the same or a related 
security.”71  Although these practices provide market liquidity and pricing efficiency, 
they may also manipulate stock prices.72
In addition to dangerous strategies, hedge fund risk is also related to the fund 
manager’s talent.  Although many funds are owned and operated by top traders and 
financial experts, many less experienced managers are breaking into the field and 
starting their own funds.73  This growing trend is due in large part to low entry 
barriers and light industry regulation.74  As one fund manager, a thirty-year-old 
college dropout, remarked: “Opening a hedge fund is easy: It’s just paperwork.”75  
Rather than waiting through long apprenticeships, which used to last at least ten 
years, some recent college graduates and other average traders are starting their own 
funds after very little training.76  This trend is fueled by organizations such as Hedge 
Fund Dynamics LLC,77 Hedge Fund Launch, LLC,78 and Green & Company, Inc.,79 
which offer a wide range of services to create and manage funds.  Even though 
young managers may have difficulty raising capital, they often use their own money 
70 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 42. 
71 Id. at 40. 
72 Id. 
73 See Roben Farzad, Hedge Fund Toddlers: Why wait for that big break when you and a few buds can manage 
millions now?, BUS. WK., July 3, 2006, at 37. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 See Hedge Fund Dynamics, Start a Hedge Fund, http://www.hedgefunddynamics.com. 
78 See Hedge Fund Launch: Matching startup hedge funds with seed capital providers, 
http://www.hedgefundlaunch.com. 
79 See Green Trader Tax, Hedge Funds, http://www.greencompany.com/HedgeFunds/index.shtml. 
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for initial investments to demonstrate their financial prowess.80  Thus, while many 
investors will steer clear of amateur fund managers, such managers still have a stake 
in the game if they have adequate financial resources to launch a fund and enter the 
marketplace. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF HIGH-STAKES GAMBLING 
 Although hedge funds traditionally aim to eliminate risk and create portfolio 
diversification, risky bets by fund managers have far-reaching implications for both 
investors and financial markets.  As unregulated investment vehicles, hedge funds 
pose significant problems; the SEC has struggled to bring funds within the scope of 
their authority.81  Without regulatory oversight, hedge funds raise a number of 
important policy concerns, including the potential for fraud, retailization, and serious 
market disruptions.82
A. Fraud: Scams and Illegal Trading 
Chief among the criticisms of hedge funds is the increasing level of hedge 
fund fraud.  The SEC has noted that the growth in the number of hedge funds has 
brought a similar increase in fraud enforcement cases.83  From 2000 to 2004, the 
SEC brought 51 cases alleging that hedge fund managers defrauded investors and 
others for an aggregate amount of 1.1 billion dollars.84  These cases involved 
“misappropriation of assets; misrepresentation of portfolio performance; falsification 
of experience, credentials and past returns; misleading disclosure regarding claimed 
trading strategies; and improper valuation of assets.”85   
                                                     
80 Hannah M. Terhune, How to Set Up Your Own Hedge Fund, HEDGE FUND CENTER, 
http://www.hedgefundcenter.com/wrapper.cfm?article_type=legal&content_id=849&content_type=
articles. 
81 See Section V, infra. 
82 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 10, 2004).   
83 Id.  Although most hedge funds are not currently subject to registration requirements under federal 
securities laws, they are all subject to antifraud statutes.  SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 72. 
84 SEC Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,056 (2004).  
85 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 73-74. 
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While most fraud cases involve situations where fund managers defraud their 
own investors, the SEC asserts that “hedge funds have been used to defraud other 
market participants.”86  Late trading and market timing of mutual fund shares has 
become a concern, as “hedge fund advisers have been key participants in . . . recent 
scandals.”87  The SEC estimates that as of 2004, approximately four hundred hedge 
funds and 87 fund managers have been involved in exploiting mutual fund investors 
for their own gain.88  These managers allegedly entered into arrangements with 
mutual fund advisers in which restrictions on market timing were waived in return 
for the fund manager’s promise to place other assets with the mutual fund adviser.89  
In addition, some hedge fund managers purportedly sought to avoid detection by 
concealing the identity of their fund.90
Similarly, critics argue that hedge funds have benefited from their large asset 
pool by receiving market “tips” from securities firms seeking commissions from 
heavy hedge fund trading.91  Securities firms allegedly “court…funds by feeding 
them steady streams of trading ideas and information about stocks, bonds and what 
other financial-market participants are up to.”92  While the sharing of such 
information is not necessarily illegal, regulators are concerned that it gives funds an 
unfair advantage and may amount to insider trading.93  Further, it is not unusual for 
hedge funds to receive calls from underwriters before a securities offering, often to 
the detriment of the issuing company.94  One such case involves the London hedge 
fund firm Marshall Wace, LLP, which manages seven billion dollars in three funds.95  
86 SEC Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,056. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 72,057. 
89 Id. at 72,056-57. 
90 Id. at 72,057. 
91 See, e.g., Henny Sender & Anita Raghavan, Worry Amid Hedge Fund Boom: Privileged Access to 
Information, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2006, at A1.  
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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Marshall Wace allegedly received two phone calls from an official at Deutsche Bank 
AG alerting the firm of a new issuance of securities by the French company, 
Alcatel.96  As a result, Marshall Wace made a 672,000 dollar profit on a large sale of 
Alcatel shares made minutes before the firm unveiled its new securities offering.97  
Though Marshall Wace denies any wrongdoing, the allegations are currently being 
investigated by French securities regulators.98
B. Retailization: Small Investors Have a Hand at the Table 
Another major concern regarding the growth of hedge funds is the increasing 
exposure of smaller, less sophisticated investors to the hedge fund world.99  
Although many hedge funds have high minimum investment requirements, the SEC 
has noted that these minimum qualifications have decreased as funds compete for 
investors.100  For instance, in 2003, the Oppenheimer Tremont funds began 
accepting investments of as little as 25,000 dollars from “affluent individuals.”101  
Critics argue that these low investment barriers will attract individuals who meet the 
monetary requirement, but who do “not possess the understanding or market 
power” to make an informed investment decision.102  In addition, the SEC has raised 
concerns that U.S. hedge funds will begin to emulate foreign funds that seek out 
smaller investors.103  However, hedge fund managers continue to argue that they do 
not intend to solicit “retail investors” because such investors are not suited for the 
                                                     
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 SEC Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,057.  
100 Id.; SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 81. 
101 Hedge Fund Milestones, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115394214778218146-
search.html?KEYWORDS=hedge+fund+milestones&COLLECTION=wsjie/6month  [hereinafter 
Hedge Fund Milestones]. 
102 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 81. 
103 SEC Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,057. 
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inherent risks of hedge funds, and “the effort required to ensure . . . suitability often 
outweighs the benefit of any investments.”104
In addition, the fear of the “retailization” of hedge funds stems from the 
growing number of public and private pension funds, universities, endowments, 
foundations and other charitable organizations that are investing in hedge funds.105  
As mentioned previously, these groups compose a considerable amount of the total 
capital invested in hedge funds.  Although the institutions themselves meet the 
criteria for investment, they do so by exposing the collective assets of their less 
sophisticated participants or beneficiaries to the hedge fund.106  For example, if a 
pension plan experiences substantial losses, it may be unable to meet its obligations 
to millions of beneficiaries,107 such as in the case of Amaranth.108  The SEC estimates 
that institutional investments in hedge funds may increase to three hundred billion 
dollars by 2008.T109  
C. Market Implications: Systemic Loss 
Perhaps the most significant concern regarding the hedge fund boom is the 
exposure of banks and other financial institutions to hedge fund risk, and the 
potential large-scale market impact of hedge funds.110  As will be addressed in 
Section VI, infra, the fall of LTCM and, more recently, Amaranth, has sparked major 
concerns throughout the financial sector, as analysts worry about how the demise of 
major hedge funds will affect banks, institutions, and the entire economy.  Although, 
as of July 2006, hedge funds account for only five percent of all U.S. assets under 
management, such funds compose approximately thirty percent of all U.S. equity 
trading volume.111  In fact, a 2003 article asserted that one hedge fund adviser alone 
                                                     
104 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 80-81. 
105 See SEC Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,057-58. 
106  SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 82. 
107 Id. 
108 See Section VI, infra. 
109 SEC Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,058. 
110 See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 29. 
111 Regulation Testimony, supra note 31.  
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was “responsible for an average of five percent of the daily trading volume of the 
New York Stock Exchange.”112  Thus, hedge funds exert an enormous influence in 
the marketplace; experts have become increasingly concerned about the stability of 
financial markets as a result.  
Despite their relatively small market share, the impact of hedge funds is 
amplified by their active trading strategies and aggressive use of leverage.113  Many 
analysts are concerned that these practices may cause widespread systemic losses to 
other firms, which will disrupt global financial markets.114  In addition, hedge funds 
have significant positions in many market segments so that if a fund collapses, the 
market segment may also falter.115  The consequences could be devastating, and the 
fall of a single hedge fund could bring about an economic catastrophe. 
V. MONITORING THE BETS AND THE PLAYING FIELD 
 Despite the many policy concerns, hedge funds remain largely unregulated; 
the majority of hedge funds fall within exceptions to securities law, and thereby 
avoid registration requirements.116  However, the expansive growth of the industry 
has attracted increasing attention from the SEC and other regulatory agencies.117  
Recent scandals have contributed to this focus as investors, financial services entities, 
and businesses express concern over this highly unregulated industry.  The SEC, 
therefore, has taken steps to bring hedge funds within the scope of its authority.  The 
following Sections provide an overview of the applicability of federal securities laws 
to hedge funds, and explain the SEC’s best attempt at regulation so far, which was 
recently overturned in Goldstein v. SEC. 
 
 
112 SEC Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,056 (citing Marcia Vickers, The Most Powerful Trader on 
Wall Street You’ve Never Heard Of, BUS. WK., July 21, 2003, at 66). 
113 PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 2. 
114 See, e.g., Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 704 (2000). 
115 Id. at 704-05. 
116 See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 11. 
117 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 4. 
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A. Regulatory Loopholes 
1. The Investment Company Act of 1940 
 The Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Company Act”)118 requires all 
“investment companies” to register with the SEC before they offer or sell 
securities.119  Upon registration, an “investment company is subject to technical, 
complex and extensive substantive regulation of its activities.”120  Most hedge funds 
fall within the definition of “investment company” under the Company Act.121  
Hedge funds, however, usually rely on the “100-Owner Limit” exception or the 
“Qualified Purchaser” exception to avoid registration.  The “100-Owner Limit” 
exception “excludes any pooled investment vehicle” that “does not have more than 
100 beneficial owners of its outstanding securities . . . and does not make or propose 
                                                     
11815 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2007). 
119 Id. § 80a-7(a)(1).  This statute provides,  
No investment company organized or otherwise created under the laws of the 
United States or of a State and having a board of directors, unless registered under 
section 80a-8 of this title, shall directly or indirectly . . . offer for sale, sell, or deliver 
after sale, by the use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, any security or any interest in a security, whether the issuer of such 
security is such investment company or another person; or offer for sale, sell, or 
deliver after sale any such security or interest, having reason to believe that such 
security or interest will be made the subject of a public offering by use of the mails 
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . . 
Id. 
120 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 61. 
121 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 11.  Two definitions of “investment company” apply to most 
hedge funds.  
When used in this title, “investment company” means any issuer which (A) is or holds itself 
out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, 
reinvesting or trading in securities . . . ; or (C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the 
business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or 
proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the 
value of such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an 
unconsolidated basis.   
15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-3(a)(1). 
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to make a public offering of its securities.”122  The “Qualified Purchaser” exception 
excludes issuers whose “beneficial owners of outstanding securities” are “qualified 
purchasers,” as defined under the Company Act, provided that the issuer “does not 
make or propose to make a public offering of its securities.”123  Although there are a 
number of specific requirements to claim either exception, the vast majority of hedge 
funds generally meet these requirements.  Thus, the Company Act does not regulate 
these entities adequately. 
2. The Securities Act of 1933 
 The Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”)124 makes it unlawful to sell a security 
unless it is registered with the SEC.125  The interests in limited partnerships and 
limited liability companies that are typically offered by hedge funds fall within the 
definition of “securities.”126  Thus, hedge funds are required to register under the 
                                                     
122 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 62.  The Company Act and SEC rules thereunder 
determine how to calculate the number of “beneficial owners” and the standards for “looking-
through” an investing entity to include its shareholders in the calculation.  Id. at 62-63; 15 U.S.C.A. § 
80a-3(c)(1). 
123 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 74-75.  The Company Act and the SEC rules 
thereunder determine how to calculate a “qualified purchaser” and layout the other requirements to 
claim the exception. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-3(c)(7), 80a-2(a)(51). 
124 Id. §§ 77a to 77aa. 
125 Id. § 77e(c).  This statute provides,       
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any means 
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of 
the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any 
prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed 
as to such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal 
order or stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any 
public proceeding or examination under section 77h of this title.   
Id.     
126 Limited partnerships and limited liability companies fall within the catch-all category of 
“investment contracts” under the 1933 Act’s definition of securities.  DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., 
supra note 13, at 111.  “An ‘investment contract’ is an arrangement where individuals are ‘led to invest 
money in a common enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit solely through the 
efforts of the promoter or of some one other than themselves.’”  Id. (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. 
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1945)). 
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1933 Act unless they are exempt from registration.127  Most hedge funds fall under 
the “private placement” exemption, which excludes “transactions by an issuer not 
involving any public offering.”128  However, the standards to qualify under this 
provision are somewhat subjective.129  Therefore, hedge funds often seek exemption 
under Rule 506 of Regulation D, which operates as a “safe harbor” for private 
offerings.130  Rule 506 provides an issuer with certainty that transactions meeting the 
specific requirements of the rule will be deemed not to “involv[e] any public 
offering.”131  Hedge funds typically meet these requirements by selling interests in 
the fund only to “accredited investors,” such as wealthy individuals and 
institutions.132  Thus, the registration requirement of the 1933 Act does not apply to 
many hedge funds.  
3. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”)133 has several provisions 
that might apply to a hedge fund.  First, the 1934 Act requires any broker or dealer 
                                                     
127 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 13-14. 
128 Id. at 14; 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(2). 
129 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 113.  See generally Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (“An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for 
themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any public offering.”); Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Murphy, 626 
F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980) (“If an offering is small and is made directly to the offerees ‘rather than 
through the facilities of public distribution such as investment bankers or the securities exchanges,’ a 
court is more likely to find that it is private.” (quoting Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int’l Franchises, Inc., 
448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971)); Gen. Life of Missouri Inv. Co. v. Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774 (8th 
Cir. 1976) (“Many courts have applied the Supreme Court’s ‘focus of inquiry’ in determining whether 
a given transaction involves a public offering within the meaning of § 4(2) of the Act and have based 
their decisions on the presence or absence of the offerees’ need for the protections afforded by 
registration, i.e., whether the offerees were shown to have access to the kind of information the 
registration . . . would disclose.”). 
130 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 14.   
131 Mark v. FSC Sec. Corp., 870 F.2d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 1989); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2007) 
(“Exemption.  Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy the conditions in paragraph (b) of 
this section shall be deemed to be transactions not involving any public offering within the meaning 
of section 4(2) of the Act.”). 
132 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 14-16; 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
133 15.U.S.C.A. §§ 78a to 77nn. 
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who offers or sells securities to register with the SEC.134  Hedge fund companies may 
fall within the definition of “dealer” under the 1934 Act135 because most funds buy 
and sell securities for their own accounts.136  However, many hedge funds are 
excluded from this definition because of the partnership structure and other activities 
they engage in.137  In addition, although some fund managers fit within the definition 
of “broker,”138 many qualify for a safe harbor exemption as an “associated person of 
an issuer.”139  Under Section 12 of the 1934 Act, hedge fund companies might be 
134 Id. § 78o(a)(1).  This statute provides, 
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer which is either a person other than a 
natural person or a natural person not associated with a broker or dealer which is a 
person other than a natural person (other than such a broker or dealer whose 
business is exclusively intrastate and who does not make use of any facility of a 
national securities exchange) to make use of the mails or any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transactions in, or to induce or 
attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than an exempted 
security or commercial paper, bankers’ acceptances, or commercial bills) unless 
such broker or dealer is registered in accordance with subsection (b) of this section. 
Id. 
135 Dealer is defined in the 1934 Act as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling 
securities for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.”  Id. § 78c(a)(5). 
136 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 246. 
137 See id. at 246-47.  In several No-Action letters, the SEC has identified factors to consider when 
identifying a “dealer.”  Id.  Namely,  
whether the person purchases or sells securities as principal to or from customers, 
runs a book of repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements, uses an interdealer 
broker for securities transactions, issues or originates any securities, or guarantees 
contract performance or indemnifies the parties for any loss or liability from the 
failure of the transaction to be successfully consummated. 
Id.  Although hedge funds generally “issue or originate securities” (i.e., the interests in the hedge 
fund), the typical fund does not engage in any of the other mentioned activities.  Id. 
138 “Broker” is defined as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities 
for the account of others.”  15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(4)(A). 
139 See DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 241-42; 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (2007).  
“‘Associated person of an issuer’ includes any general partner of an issuer and any natural person who 
is an employee, officer, director or partner of a corporate general partner of a limited partnership that 
is the issuer.”  DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 241.  Provided that they meet certain 
requirements, hedge fund managers may qualify for this exception.  Id. at 241-42.  In addition, hedge 
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required to register classes of equity securities with five hundred or more holders of 
record and assets in excess of ten million dollars at the end of the fiscal year.140  
However, because registration of a class of equity securities subjects the registrant to 
a number of reporting requirements, most funds avoid the registration requirement 
by having fewer than five hundred holders of record.141  Finally, hedge funds may be 
subject to several “beneficial ownership” filing requirements if they beneficially own 
greater than five percent of a class of equity securities that are registered with the 
SEC under Section 12.142  Many hedge funds can easily avoid this requirement as 
well. 
B. Attempted Regulation 
1. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
Perhaps the most relevant federal securities statute for hedge funds, however, 
is the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”).143  A companion statute to 
the Company Act, the Advisers Act was created “to ‘substitute a philosophy of full 
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor’ in the investment advisory 
profession.”144  In this regard, all “investment advisers” must register with the SEC 
unless they are exempt from registration.145  Registration under the Advisers Act can 
                                                                                                                                                 
funds can avoid registration if they are not in the business of selling securities, which depends on the 
extent of their securities activities.  Id. at 243.  
140 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 18.   
141 Id. at 18-19. 
142 Id. at 19-20.  “Beneficial owners” under Sections 13 and 16 of the 1934 Act are required to disclose 
the amount of equity securities beneficially owned and other material information regarding the 
reporting person.  Id. 
143 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2007). 
144 Goldstein v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Sec. Exch. Comm’n 
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). 
145 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(a).  This statute provides,  
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section 80b-3a of this title, 
it shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, unless registered under this section, 
to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in 
connection with his or its business as an investment adviser. 
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be burdensome on advisers, as they are subjected to significant SEC scrutiny.  For 
instance, registered advisers are required to provide both the SEC and investors with 
current information about their business practices, disciplinary history, and other 
pertinent data.146  Investment advisers must provide a disclosure statement and 
maintain an updated Form ADV with the SEC.147  In addition, “[r]egistered advisers 
must maintain required books and records and submit to periodic examinations.”148  
Advisers also owe a fiduciary obligation to their clients; they must safeguard clients’ 
assets, disclose material conflicts, and seek the best execution for client 
transactions.149  Overall, investment adviser registration allows the SEC to keep a 
census of advisers so it can “respond to, initiate, and take remedial action on 
complaints against fraudulent advisers.”150
Under the Advisers Act, an “investment adviser” is “any person who, for 
compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value of 
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or 
who . . . issues or promulgates analyses or reports regarding securities.”151  Nearly 
every hedge fund manager meets this definition,152 and, as the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals pointed out in Abrahamson v. Fleschner, hedge fund general partners are 
“investment advisers.”153  As a result, essentially all hedge funds fall within the 
regulatory scope of the Advisers Act, and managers hope to avoid registration under 
an exemption.  More specifically, most managers are exempt from registration under 
a provision that excludes investment advisers who have “fewer than 15 clients during 
the preceding 12 months, do not hold themselves out generally to the public as an 
investment adviser and are not an investment adviser to a registered investment 
 
Id. 
146 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 20-21. 
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
149 SEC Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,054. 
150 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876. 
151 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-2(11) (2007). 
152 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 20. 
153 Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 869-70 (2nd Cir. 1977). 
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company.”154   Traditional SEC rules provided that investment advisers may count a 
“legal organization” as a single client.155  Therefore, institutions, pension plans, and 
other hedge funds were each counted as one client, even though they had hundreds 
of investors or beneficiaries.156  Although a majority of hedge fund advisers were 
excluded from registration under this provision, they were still required to comply 
with the Adviser Act’s antifraud provisions.157
2. SEC Rule 203(b)(3)-2 
 In light of the thousands of hedge funds advisers claiming the “private issuer 
exemption,” the SEC felt that the current regulatory framework did not effectuate 
Congress’ intent to exempt only those advisers with a small number of clients whose 
activities were “unlikely to affect national securities markets.”158  Rather, hedge fund 
advisers were taking advantage of the “exemption to operate large investment 
advisory firms without being registered.”159  The SEC argued that hedge funds and 
other advisers were pooling client assets and creating limited partnerships, business 
trusts, and corporations in order to count these entities as a single client and avoid 
registration.160  Advisers were misusing the private issuer exemption to manage large 
amounts of client assets, and indirectly, maintain a large number of clients.161  In 
addition, the SEC argued that the private issuer exemption did not adequately 
address growing problems within the industry.162  With so many hedge fund advisers 
excluded from any type of registration, the SEC argued that there was no effective 
                                                     
154 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 21; 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(b)(3). 
155 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 21. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 SEC Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,054. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id.  
162 See id. at 72,059. 
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program in place to deter or detect fraud, to gather basic information about the 
hedge fund industry, and to protect investors.163
To combat these problems, the SEC adopted Rule 203(b)(3)-2164 in 
December 2004, which effectively closed the private issuer loophole.  This rule 
required that advisers “count as clients the shareholders, limited partners, members, 
or beneficiaries . . . of a private fund.”165  As a result, advisers would have to “look 
through” the advised entity and consider the surrounding circumstances of the 
advisory arrangement.166  The SEC asserted that the new rule was consistent with the 
purpose of the Advisers Act, and argued that the private issuer “exemption does not 
require a rigid approach to counting clients without consideration of the surrounding 
circumstances.”167  By adopting Rule 203(b)(3)-2, and effectively changing the 
requirements of the private issuer exemption, the SEC hoped to bring a majority of 
investment advisers, and the hedge funds they manage, under regulatory control.168  
Advisers were required to register under the new rule by February 1, 2006.169
The SEC argued that registration under the Advisers Act would provide 
extensive benefits to the securities markets, although many critics disagreed.170  
Specifically, the SEC argued that registration would help identify harmful practices at 
an early stage, thereby deterring fraud and protecting investors.171  In addition, the 
SEC emphasized that registration would require hedge funds to adopt compliance 
programs and submit to routine examinations.172  But perhaps most importantly, 
163 See id.  
164 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (repealed 2006). 
165 Id. 
166 SEC Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,067-68. 
167 Id. at 72,068. 
168 Id. at 72,054. 
169 Id.  
170 See id. at 72,062. 
171 Id. at 72,061. 
172 Id. at 72,063. 
 
404             TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 8 
 
registration would provide the SEC “with the ability to collect important 
information” regarding the hedge fund industry, fund strategies, and fund advisers.173  
Such information would provide investors and other market participants with 
disclosure,174 and is necessary for determining the impact of hedge funds on national 
financial markets, the potential for “retailization,” and other industry trends.T175
3. Goldstein v. SEC 
Rule 203(b)(3)-2 quickly came under attack by hedge fund advisers, trade 
associations, and other critics who were concerned about compliance costs and 
inefficiencies.176  Opponents asserted that the new proposal would not achieve the 
desired results and that hedge funds would be forced to increase their management 
fees.177  Despite this opposition, the SEC was successful in getting a total of 2,423 
fund managers registered under the Advisers Act by April 2006.178  Although some 
of these hedge fund advisers had registered voluntarily before Rule 203(b)(3)-2 was 
enacted,179 more than 1,000 new hedge fund advisers registered between April 2005 
and April 2006.180
 The SEC’s registration success, however, came to a crashing halt on June 23, 
2006, when the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated 
                                                     
173 Id. at 72,061.  As stated in the SEC Release adopting the new rule, “Currently, neither we nor any 
other government agency has any reliable data on even the number of hedge funds or the amount of 
their assets.  We must rely on third-party surveys and reports, which often conflict and may be 
unreliable.”  Id. 
174 See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 83. 
175 See SEC Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,061. 
176 Id. at 72,059. 
177 Id.  The SEC’s counterarguments are presented in a Cost-Benefit analysis in Release No. IA-2333. 
178 INV. ADVISER ASS’N & NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., EVOLUTION REVOLUTION 2006: A PROFILE 
OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISER PROFESSION 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.icaa.org/public/evolution_revolution-2006.pdf [hereinafter EVOLUTION REVOLUTION]. 
179 Some advisers register voluntarily because investors demand that they do or for competitive 
reasons.  SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 22. 
180  EVOLUTION REVOLUTION, supra note 178, at 4. 
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Rule 203(b)(3)-2.181  In Goldstein v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit Court held that the SEC’s 
interpretation of “client” under the new rule was unreasonable.182  The Court’s 
analysis focused on the definition of “investment adviser” under the Advisers Act, 
noting that an adviser is defined as “any person who, for compensation, engages in 
the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings.”183  
The court stated that hedge fund investors do not receive advice directly from the 
fund’s manager.184  Rather, the fund manager collects the investor’s money and then 
decides what investment strategy to pursue.185  In this sense, the hedge fund adviser 
owes a fiduciary obligation “only to the fund, not to the fund’s investors.”186  The 
Goldstein court further held that, “[i]f the investors are owed a fiduciary duty and the 
entity is also owed a fiduciary duty, then the adviser will inevitably face conflicts of 
interest.”187  Therefore, “client” cannot mean one thing when determining to whom 
fiduciary obligations are owed, and another when determining who is required to 
register under the Adviser’s Act.188  Thus, the court held that the SEC’s 
interpretation of “client” came “close to violating the plain language of the statute,” 
and struck down Rule 203(b)(3)-2.189  The court explained, “That the [SEC] wanted a 
hook on which to hang more comprehensive regulation of hedge funds may be 
understandable.  But the [SEC] may not accomplish its objective by a manipulation 
of meaning.”190   
 Goldstein is a major victory for hedge fund advisers who fought registration 
under the Advisers Act.  Although the SEC can appeal this decision, Chairman 
181 Goldstein v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
182 Id. at 880-81. 
183 Id. at 879 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11)). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 879-80. 
186 Id. at 881. 
187 Id.  
188 Id. at 882. 
189 Id. at 881. 
190 Id. at 882. 
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Christopher Cox announced that he would not seek a U.S. Supreme Court review of 
the case.191  The impact that this decision will have on the number of registered 
hedge fund managers is largely unknown, but 101 hedge fund advisers have already 
de-registered as of October 2006, and that figure is expected to increase.192  As a 
result, the future of hedge fund regulation is uncertain, but several alternative 
solutions have recently emerged.193   
VI. LOSING BETS: WHEN THE TABLE FOLDS 
Almost immediately after Goldstein, the financial industry once again 
witnessed the downfall of a major hedge fund and the enormous consequences that 
followed.  As the largest collapse in hedge fund history, the downfall of Amaranth 
came as a harsh blow to regulators.  It is clear that while hedge fund investors stand 
to gain enormously from investments, often earning thirty percent or more annual 
returns,194 they also stand to lose—sometimes even more than they win.  Amaranth 
illustrates the risky bets advisers often make and the stinging results of a bad choice. 
The hedge fund industry has suffered several devastating losses over the 
years, which have far-reaching impacts.  By employing risky strategies and making 
dangerous bets, funds often find themselves in dire positions with overextended 
investments and falling prices.  Such is the case with the fall of LTCM in 1998, and, 
more recently, Amaranth.  Although LTCM and Amaranth avoided large-scale 
market disruption because of buyouts from other financial institutions, their demise 
demonstrates the devastating impact that unregulated hedge funds have on both 
investors and the market.  Increasing concern for regulation now mounts as many 
funds produce low returns in the wake of Amaranth’s downfall, and speculators keep 
a lookout for the next big “loser.” 
 
 
 
191 Ron Orol, SEC Not Appealing Hedge Fund Ruling, THE DEAL, Aug. 8, 2006, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/pc/LawArticleCorp.jsp?id=1154960917659&rss=pc.   
192 Julie Fishman-Lapin, Registration Reconsidered, THE STAMFORD ADVOCATE, Oct. 13, 2006.  
193 See Section VII, infra. 
194 See Hedge Fund Milestones, supra note 101.   
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A. Pre-Amaranth: Long Term Capital Management 
Although several hedge funds suffered significant loses and were forced to 
shut down,195 LTCM has received the most attention because of the financial crisis 
that almost resulted.  Once considered the “Dream Team” with returns of forty 
percent, LTCM used a variety of trading strategies including “shorted” Treasury 
bond futures and high yielding “mortgage-backed or corporate debt securities.”196  
LTCM held large positions in various markets and was extensively leveraged, with a 
balance sheet ratio of twenty-five to one; this exposed the fund to major market 
risks.197  In 1998, the fund began experiencing devastating financial hardships, with a 
loss of over fifty percent of its equity.198  With losses mounting, LTCM could not 
continue to meet its cash flow obligations to creditors because of its size and the 
leverage involved.199  Market participants became concerned about the possibility 
that LTCM would collapse and bring severe consequences to fragile world 
markets.200  In addition, major banks and other creditors who enabled LTCM to 
build up its leveraged positions were concerned about the effect of a default on their 
operations.201  As a result, the banks involved and the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York came to an agreement with LTCM in which they would invest 3.6 billion 
dollars to bail out the fund, in exchange for a ninety percent equity stake in 
                                                     
195 For instance, Michael Steinhardt was forced to shut down his $2.6 billion investment partnerships 
in 1995 after using aggressive, short-term trading and risky market bets since he started the fund in 
1967.  Id.  In 1998, Everest Capital Ltd. lost nearly half of its $2.7 billion under management, effecting 
the endowments of both Yale and Brown universities.  Id.  And, in 2000, Tiger Management LLC, 
closed down most of its operations and liquidated $6 billion in investments due to the market rush to 
Internet stocks.  Id. 
196 Hedge Fund Gets Help, CNN MONEY, Sept. 23, 1998, 
http://money.cnn.com/1998/09/23/investing/longterm; PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 
10, at 10-11. 
197 PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 11-12. 
198 Id. at 12. 
199 Id. at 12-13. 
200 Id. at 13. 
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LTCM.202  Although investors were seriously harmed, LTCM avoided a major world 
financial crisis largely due to the assistance of other financial institutions.203
B. Amaranth Advisors, LLC 
While the financial industry was still talking about the fall of LTCM, and in 
the wake of the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Goldstein, another major hedge fund 
suffered serious losses and was forced to close its doors.  Amaranth, a Connecticut 
based hedge fund with approximately nine billion dollars in assets, lost approximately 
five billion dollars in one week.204  Amaranth’s assets under management fell to 
roughly 4.5 billion dollars during the first week of September 2006, as the result of 
risky bets in natural gas made by 32-year-old trader Brian Hunter. 205  Amaranth’s 
demise came in less than a month and was the largest collapse in hedge fund 
history.206
Amaranth’s failure is linked to Hunter’s aggressive trading in natural gas 
futures.207  Hunter employed a trading strategy focused on exploiting futures 
contracts for natural gas, while relying heavily on “borrowed money to double-down 
on his bets.”208  With generous lines of credit from banks, Hunter leveraged 
aggressively209 and increased his exposure in an extremely volatile commodities 
                                                     
202 Id. at 14. 
203 For more information on the fall of LTCM, see LOWENSTEIN, supra note 1; NICHOLAS DUNBAR, 
INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE LEGENDS 
BEHIND IT (2000); Jonathan H. Gatsik, Hedge Funds: The Ultimate Game of Liar’s Poker, 35 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 591 (2001). 
204 Ann Davis, Blue Flameout: How Giant Bets on Natural Gas Sank Brash Hedge-Fund Trader, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 19, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Davis]. 
205 See id. 
206 Katherine Burton, Amaranth to Get Advice From Fortress Investment on Asset Sales, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 2, 
2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aPz3nvmZNWP4&refer=home. 
207 Davis, supra note 204. 
208 Ann Davis et al., What Went Wrong at Amaranth – Mistakes at the Hedge Fund Include Key Trader’s 
Confusing Paper Gains With Cash Profits, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2006, at C1 [hereinafter Davis et al.]. 
209 Id.  “Funds like Amaranth are able to borrow three to eight times their initial capital to make bets 
thousands of times over.  Mr. Hunter sometimes held 100,000 positions in a single contract, say 
traders familiar with his bets.”  Id. 
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market.210  Hunter’s strategy involved making complex wagers on natural gas by 
analyzing weather conditions and other factors in an attempt to predict how prices 
would fare at some point in the future.211  Based on his analysis, Hunter would bet 
against market prices and attempt to take advantage of large price swings from both 
declines and surges.212   
Hunter’s bets often paid off, and at the end of April 2006, he was up by two 
billion dollars for the year.213  By September 2006, however, the market quickly 
changed and gas prices fell drastically.214  Hunter’s brash bets fell with market 
volatility, which is “proof of how quickly fortunes can reverse in gyrating 
commodities markets.”215  Although much about Amaranth’s trading strategy is 
unknown, some analysts speculate that Hunter’s positions were so large that he could 
not get out of them when the market turned.216  As a result, the net asset value of 
Amaranth funds dropped sixty-five to seventy percent by October 2006, which sent 
investors scrambling.217   
In an attempt at recovery, Amaranth quickly sold its energy portfolio to J.P. 
Morgan Chase & Co. (“J.P. Morgan”) and the hedge fund Citadel Investment 
Group, LLC (“Citadel”).218  Despite limited interest in the large and complicated 
holdings, J.P. Morgan and Citadel believed that the investments would be more 
valuable than the market assumed, and that they could balance the risk of the trades 
210 Davis, supra note 204. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Davis, supra note 204; Davis et al., supra note 208. 
215 Davis, supra note 204. 
216 Id. 
217 Alistair Barr, Amaranth to sell all remaining positions: Hedge fund suspends redemptions to try to boost proceeds 
from asset sales, MARKETWATCH, Sept. 29, 2006, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid={59B167B2-2D4D-4C80-9BFC-
996F997C20DD}&dist=rss&siteid=mktw [hereinafter Barr]. 
218 Gregory Zuckerman, How the Wreck from Amaranth was Contained, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2006, at C3. 
 
410             TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 8 
 
                                                     
with other investments.219  This smooth transaction eased concerns about broad 
market turmoil and “ripple effects” from the hedge fund’s failure.220  In addition, 
with the aide of Fortress Investment Group LLC, Amaranth suspended client 
redemptions in order to liquidate three billion dollars that remained in 
investments.221  It is unclear how much investors will actually receive from the sale, 
as it will take time to maximize proceeds.222  Major investors that were affected by 
Amaranth’s collapse include the pension fund of 3M Co., funds of hedge funds run 
by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, and the San Diego County Employees 
Retirement Association, which invested 175 million dollars with Amaranth.223
Although Amaranth has thus far avoided widespread market implications 
(largely due to the help of J.P. Morgan and Citadel), the hedge fund’s collapse has 
caused major repercussions for investors; the fund is certainly not out of “hot water” 
yet.  Some investors, including the San Diego pension fund, are considering legal 
recourse for their losses, including a potential class action lawsuit.224  In addition, 
Amaranth has raised increased concerns regarding the trading practices of funds and 
the need for regulation to ensure that a similar incident does not happen in the 
future.  As the largest failure in hedge fund history, some experts argue that 
Amaranth will spark the beginning of a trend in the industry and are anticipating a 
“‘fire or ice’ shakeout.”225  Meaning, the industry will either experience “a wave of 
collapsing funds” (“fire”), or significant diminishing returns because too many funds 
will pursue the same investment strategies (“ice”).226  Either way, Amaranth’s failure 
could be a turning point in the industry, as investors become increasingly concerned 
with disclosure, regulation, and the impact of risky hedge fund bets. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Katherine Burton, Amaranth Hires Fortress Investment to Sell Assets, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 1, 2006, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601014&sid=ajdgTUeNTeSU&refer=funds. 
222 See Barr, supra note 217. 
223 Id.; Davis et al., supra note 208. 
224 Josh Gerstein, Lawyers Circle After Failure of Hedge Fund, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 20, 2006, Business Section 
at 1, available at http://www.nysun.com/article/41922.  
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VII. SOLUTIONS: IS RECOVERY IN SIGHT? 
 The holding in the Goldstein case effectively blocked a recent attempt by the 
SEC to bring the hedge fund industry within its regulatory scope.  The Amaranth 
disaster that followed demonstrates the degree to which unregulated advisers can 
gamble with billions of investor dollars in a playing field with little to no oversight.   
Although Amaranth and LTCM avoided serious damage to the financial markets, 
future hedge funds may not be so lucky.  Without the assistance of major financial 
institutions to “bail out” these failing entities, one must wonder how the cards would 
have played out.  In many ways, it is unfair to allow hedge funds and their managers 
to operate in this manner and to make extremely risky bets without some degree of 
accountability.  In the absence of regulatory control, hedge fund managers are free to 
play the market and gamble with investors’ money, much like high-rollers at the 
roulette wheel.  Although hedge funds stand to win big when they “double-down” 
with leveraged positions, they can also lose their bank roll, and bring devastating 
consequences to the entire market.  As a result, industry experts are proposing 
solutions to “regulate the table” in an effort to avoid future pitfalls from the Las 
Vegas style investing techniques of many hedge fund advisers. 
 Although several hedge funds have risk management systems in place, these 
vary by firm in the absence of industry-wide standards.227  Therefore, one potential 
solution is industry self-regulation, in which hedge funds would launch an 
overarching organization.  Such an entity could model itself after the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) or the National Futures Association, 
and would set standards for disclosure and other principles, as well as punish 
member firms for violations.228  However, many critics of this proposition argue that 
the industry cannot be trusted to police itself; others argue that many funds may not 
join such an organization.229
 Similarly, another solution is the potential for “risk ratings” of hedge funds 
by companies like Moody’s and Morningstar, Inc.230  Moody’s recently published its 
227 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 67. 
228 David Enrich & Arden Dale, Hedge Fund, Regulate Thyself – Could Self-Policing Help Avoid More 
Government Oversight?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2006, at B4. 
229 Id. 
230 See Serena Ng, Moody’s Offers Glimpse Inside a Hedge Fund – Sorin-Run Vehicle is the First to be Publicly 
Graded Based on Firm’s ‘Operational Risks,’ WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2006, at C1. 
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first operational risk rating of Sorin Capital Management, LLC, and hopes to 
conduct similar reviews in the future.231  However, these ratings are voluntary and 
there is concern within the industry about releasing information regarding 
investment strategies and internal operations.232  Thus, while ratings would offer 
significant information to investors, many funds may prefer to maintain their privacy.  
Much like the self-regulatory organization solution, fund ratings may have little effect 
on the problem of regulation or on the industry as a whole. 
The best solution to achieve oversight of the hedge fund industry appears to 
be future congressional legislation.  Almost immediately after the court’s decision in 
Goldstein, a bill was introduced in the House to restore SEC Rule 203(b)(3)-2.233  On 
June 29, 2006, Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) introduced a bill to “amend the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to authorize the Commission to require the 
registration of hedge fund advisers under that Act.”234  If enacted, this bill would 
“authorize the . . . (SEC) to: (1) limit the availability of this exemption; and (2) 
require the registration of any investment adviser by requiring that certain 
shareholders, partners, and beneficial owners of, or investors in, clients of the adviser 
be counted as clients themselves.”235  The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on 
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises on July 18, 
2006 and awaits further congressional action in the next session.236  Even if the bill is 
not adopted, it is clear that lawmakers realize the impact of hedge funds on financial 
markets and are taking steps toward industry regulation.  Hedge fund critics hope 
that, even if this bill is not passed, a similar one will be proposed in the near future to 
regulate the reckless behavior of many funds and their advisers.  
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233 Securities and Exchange Commission Authority Restoration Act of 2006, H.R. 5712, 109th Cong. 
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